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. BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
without restriction. Hill v. Florida9 2 involved the licensing of union agents,
giving the state power to forbid the issuance of such. license, for enumerated
reasons. 93 This licensing power was held to interfere with the intention of
Congress to grant full freedom to employees in choosing union representatives,
and to substitute Florida's judgment for that of the workers.
The practical effect of Section 8 of the New York Act, is to require the
International Union to dismiss the union representative with a felony record,
or function without dues. It is futile to elect one with such a debility, since a
dismissal is certain. The Court of Appeals cites no cases allowing states to
impose such restrictions on union officials. There is serious doubt that the state.
e 4
may impose such restrictions in the light of Hill v. Florida.
95
The Labor Management Reform Act, passed this year, sets up a
tomprehensive scheme to exclude convicted felons from union office. It would
seem that Congress is now occupying this field, if it has not in the past. This
case is presently on the Supreme Court docket, but the significance of any
decision will be affected by the new labor bill.
STATE STATUTE PUNISHING WIRE-TAPPiNG

PER SE, NOT

PRE-EMPTED

The New York Penal Law, Section 1423(6), provides, that it is a felony
to "unlawfully and willfully cut, break, tap or make any connection with any
telegraph or telephone line, wire, cable or instrument, or read or copy in any
unauthorized manner, any message, communication, or report passing over it
in this state."
The Federal Communications Act, Section 605 provides in part, that
((no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence .. . of such intercepted communication
to any person." A violation of this section is punishable under Section 501
of the same act, by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both.
Whether the latter federal provision had pre-empted the New York
statute, was seriously questioned in the case of People v. Broady," where the
Court of Appeals upheld a conviction under Section 1423(6), holding that the
validity of that section was unaltered by the federal statute.
Initially, the Court was faced with the contention that the word "willfully,"
as used in Section 1423(6), must be construed as meaning maliciously or
spitefully, and as the jury had not been charged on this element, defendant's
conviction was erroneous as a matter of law. If thus construed, reasoned the
defendant, the statute would be saved from pre-emption by Section 605,
since it would be regarded as a malicious mischief provision, preventing local
92.

93.
must be
94.
95.
96.

325 U.S. 538 (1943).

Must be a citizen of the United States for ten years, no felony convictions, and
a person of good moral character.
See also, Hotel Employees Union v. Sax Enterprises, supra note 85.
PuB. L. No. 86, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 504(a).
5 N.Y.2d 500, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1959).

88

COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
harm to property, and as such would be a valid exercise of the State's police
power. If interpreted as intended to protect the privacy of telephone conversations, the State provision would allegedly be pre-empted by Section 605.
Recent legislative activity in the area, 97 placing Section 1423(6) in a new
article and section of the Penal Law,98 and thus segregating it from other
provisions of that section requiring malice, was viewed by the Court as placing
primary emphasis on the crime of wire-tapping as an invasion of personal
privacy, and as such, the word "willfully" meant a conscious act, consciously
done.
Whether the New York statute, thus interpreted, conflicted with the
federal scheme of regulating telephonic communication, was the most difficult
problem before the Court. They indicated that, in their opinion, Section
1423(6) did not interfere with federal constitutional jurisdiction under the
commerce clause, since it was merely a local police measure to protect state
residents from invasions of their privacy, rather than a purported regulation
of telephonic communications. At to whether there was an interference with
federal criminal jurisdiction, the Court's answer was more difficult to articulate,
since the nature of the offense punishable by Section 605 was not clear. If
both an interception and a divulgence were requisites of a federal violation,
the New York provision punishing the act of interception alone, would not
appear to conflict. If, however, a federal violation resulted from the solitary
act of interception, the conflict between the two statutes is readily apparent.
The Court adopted the former construction, although their reasoning is not
free from doubt. 99
The Court assumed, however, that a conflict in regard to federal criminal
jurisdiction existed, in order to analyze whether, by enacting the Federal
Communications Act, including Section 605, Congress manifested an intention
to occupy the field to the exclusion of state legislation on the same subject.
If Congress had done so, state legislation could not stand, whether it conflicted
with or merely supplemented the federal scheme.'
The criteria enunciated in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,2 were found by the
Court to be determinative in a situation where Congress has not specifically
indicated an intention to occupy a field of legislation. In that case, the court
indicated that a state criminal statute is superseded where the federal scheme
is so pervasive it leaves no room for supplementary state laws, where the area
is one of such a dominant federal interest that state legislation is precluded,
97.

See N.Y. Lois. Doc., 1957, No. 29, p. 13 et seq.

98.

N.Y. PEN. LAW § 738.

99. The question of whether both elements were necessary under Section 605, was
specifically left unanswered in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). However,
since the statute read "interception and divulgence," the Court adopted the canon of

construction that will strictly construe a criminal statute. See Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 304-305 (1956).

1. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1955); Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad
Comm., 236 U.S. 439 (1914).
2. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra.
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or where there is danger of a state enforcement conflicting with the administration of the federal program.
The Court devoted the weight of its opinion to an analysis of the first
criterion above, whether the federal scheme of legislation, such as present here,
8
is so pervasive that state legislation cannot stand. Benanti v. United States,
is pointed to as indicating a strong public policy evinced by Section 605,
prohibiting the interception and divulgence of communications, and that
"Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state
legislation which would contradict that section and that policy." 4 (Emphasis by
the Court of Appeals in the instant case.)5 Without defining "that policy"
any further, the Court felt that Benanti did not suggest a pervasiveness that
would prohibit a state statute punishing wire-tapping. If a statute such as
Section 1423(6) is not precluded under Benanti, what state legislation is
forbidden? Since the context of the above quotation was the New York legislation authorizing wire-tapping, it may be assumed that such legislation is
now of doubtful constitutional validity, and the Court in the instant case is
apparently willing to concede this fact. Thus, absent a comprehensive scheme
of regulation, such as was present in the Nelson case,0 the Court was unwilling
to view the single clause of Section 605 as evincing a Congressional plan to
exclude the states from supplemental legislation on wire-tapping.
Under the second Nelson criterion, the Court did not deem the federal
interest present in the Federal Communications Act, i.e., in regard to the
regulation of telephonic communications, to be of the dominant nature that
would render ineffective the state's exercise of its police power, in an effort to
protect the privacy of its citizens.
The lack of any apparent federal program punishing wire-tapping per se,
as indicated by a relative lack of prosecutions under Section 605, would seem7
to render negligible any degree of possible interference with such a program.
In this regard, it is perhaps relevant to note that the applicability of Section 605
has been largely confined to questions of admissibility, in state and federal
courts, of evidence obtained in violation of the provision.8
In thus holding Section 1423(6) unaltered by the federal statute, the
fact that successive state and federal prosecutions may ensue from the same
acts, does not render the state prosecution invalid, 9 nor is the state prosecution
3. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
4. Id. at 105.
5. Supra note 96 at 512, 186 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1959).
6. The statutes there involved were the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385,
2387 (1940); Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1950).
7. The infrequent exercise of federal jurisdiction under a statute of wide potential
application, has been held significant in finding a. non-pre-emptive Congressional intent.
Atlantic Coast Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
8. Benanti v. United States, supra note 3; Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952);
Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338

(1939).
9.

Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847).
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a bar to a federal conviction,' 0 since the interests vindicated by each are not
the same.
The strained and often elusive analysis by the Court in the instant case,
indicates the relative difficulty present in a case involving the pre-emption
issue. This difficulty is in part due to the lack, even in the United States
Supreme Court, of any constant analytical approach to the solution of such
questions. The Nelson case has been viewed as a landmark case in the area,
but even the approach used there has been subject to criticism." The Court,
in using the Nelson approach in the case at bar, finds it relatively easy to
distinguish on the facts here present. The State has, of necessity, a strong
interest in upholding the validity of its statutory provisions, and is consequently
loath to overturn them absent a strong and persuasive argument to the contrary.
There are several questions left unanswered by the opinion, which will
apparently remain unanswered for the present at least, since the United States
Supreme Court, in denying certiorari,has approved of the New York Court's
finding as to the validity of Section 1423(6). However, the New York Court
has by implication agreed with Benanti, that state legislation authorizing wiretapping is a contradiction of Section 605 policy. This tacit acquiescence,
places New York Constitution Article I, Section 12, and New York Code of
Criminal Procedure, Section 813-a, which authorize state officers to tap
phones pursuant to a court order, on very tenuous footing. The future of
these provisions would appear to be uncertain.' 2
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL: ADJOURNMENT TO SECUIE

In the case of People v. Banner,'8 seventeen defendants were charged with
disorderly conduct. Although, the City Court Judge properly advised them
of their right to be represented by counsel, he failed to adequately advise them
of their additional right to a postponement in the proceedings to enable them
to obtain counsel, as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 699.' 4
The per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals held, that in order to make the
above statute "meaningful and effective," this additional right must be made
clear to the defendants by the presiding judge. Therefore, the judgment below
was reversed and a new trial was ordered.
10. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). Cranton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson:
A Case Study of Federal Pre-emption, 26 U. Cm. L. Ray. 85 (1958).
11. Broady v. New York, 28 U.S.L. Wzzx 3100 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1959).
12. See in this regard, In re Telephone Communications, 9 Misc.2d 121, 170
N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958), where Samuel H. Hofstader, J., stated that while he sat
on the bench in that session of Court, no orders under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
authorizing wire-tapping, would issue, since such orders were illegal under Benanti.
13. 5 N.Y.2d 109, 180 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1958).
14. N.Y. COD Cam:. PROC. § 699;
"1. In cases in which the courts of special sessions or police courts
have jurisdiction, when the defendant is brought before the magistrate,
the magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge against him
and of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings,
and before any further proceedings are had.
2. The magistrate must allow the defendant a reasonable time to
send for counsel and adjourn the proceedings for that purpose."

